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CHOOSING EMOTIONS: THE LATE
SARTRE AND THE EARLY FLAUBERT
"Sartre on the emotions" is usually taken to refer tothe early Sartre,
whose exercise on emotion as a category in phenomenological psychology, part
of a larger but aborted project on The Psyche, was published as SJretch 0/ a
Theory 01 the Emotions in 1939. The Psyche was intended, it seems, as the
theoretical counterpart to Nausea; in an interview with Claudine Chomez in the
same year Sartre gives evidence of having recognized early on the tendency of
every project of writing to generate a corresponding philosophical project, which
had to be tacklOO independently and thus workOO out of the system. The trouble,
he suggests there, is that technical matters can't be expressed in the beautiful
form of works of Iiterary art: "so I saw that I was obligOO to pair up, so to
speak, each novel with an essay. Thus at the same time as Nausea I was writing
The Psyche" (ES 65)
This relationship between two kinds of writing persistOO, as we know,
throughout Sartre's life, and was expressed in a later interview (with Madeleine
Chapsal) as the eruption of philosophical hemias under Iiterary pressure (5 IX:
10-11). Sorne of the projects thus generated became central to his main
philosophical work; for example the Critique 0/ Dialeetical Reason emerged
from the Flaubert project, stimulatOO by the commission that 100 to Questions
0/Method. But sorne didn't, and my sense is thatthe project on the psyche was
one of these. The fact ,that it was not published, at least in its original form,
suggests sorne reserve about its importance in the Sartrian scheme of things.
As to the part that was publishOO in the form of the SJretch, the claim that
it belongs with Nausea is, as we shall see, not particularly sustainOO by the place
of emotions in the latter work. Everything points to a deeper connection between
Nausea and Being anti Nothingness instead, given that the former began as a
"factum on contingence" in the early 1930's and that the latter is said by Sartre's
bibliographers to be "the outcome of philosophical researches undertaken by
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Sartre since 1933" (ES 85). (But then some of the material of The Psyche was
in fact incorporated in Being and Nothingness.) The questions I want to raise in
tbis paper are two: why does Sartre not make more use of emotion as a category
after the Sketch? and do the emotions, and the idea advanced there that we
choose them, survive in some other form in the later work?
One of the philosophical questions that is implicitly posed by Nausea is,
to give it a Kantian twist, "How is Roquentin possible?"-that is, given that the
world appears to him as it does, what attitude, what project, what modality must
he have adopted or been subjected to in order to live it in just that way? The
novel begins with Roquentin's reflection that something has changed-either the
world has changed, or he hase "Am I the one who has changed? If not, then it
is this room, this city, and this nature; I must choose" (N 4, emphasis added).
Roquentin chooses to consider that lbe change is in him ralber than in the world;
this, as he remarks, is the simplest, though at the same time the most
unpleasant, solution.
What sort of change has come over Roquentin? ODe isn't tempted, right
off, to say that it's an emotional change. In the ·undated pages" at the beginning
of the novel Roquetin does, it is true, speak of emotions-disgust, and fear "or
same other feeling of that sort" (N 2). But that stage passes; those feelings were
atlached to objects, whereas the change with which the narrative proper begins
is abstract, "without object" (N 4). This looks like a problem for any
phenomenological account, since the basic doctrine is that consciousness is
always consciousness of something. It turns out not to be a terribly difficult
problem, though, since a simple solution is at hand-the change doesn't have
part;cular objects, it's global, the whole world is its objecl. Such a general
modality is, for Sartre, characteristic of emotions.
If what Roquentin experiences is an emotion, however, it's not one for
which we have a name ready. Sartre calls it nausea, but nausea isn't an emotion
(or is it?-according to the James-Lange theory it's just the sort of thing that
might be one: a physiological condition with existential consequences). Nor is
it clear why Roquentin should have this emotion, if it is none. Plenty of us get
something like it-and remember that Sartre originally called the book
Melancholia, a commoner if less striking complaint-but Iike Roquentin we
often don't quite know why; it's not that anything in particular is happening to
us, hut something is certainly happening, perhaps i/J us.
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Here lies the main problematic of tbe emotions, not so much of their
nature as of tbeir aetiology. Something moves us, is moving, which is a shade
more intense than our simply heing touched by it, though both expressions
suggest real contact or influence. But the "motion" of emotion: is the mover
without or within? Motion there surely is, of some sorte English gets "emotion"
in its emotional sense througb French, where the prefix ~- is not, according to
French philologists, from Latin ex, though there is Latin emoveo with the sense
of moving physically, people out of marketplaces or walls from their foundations
as in eartbquakes. (Arcbaic English "emotion" has this sense: the emotions of
the Turks cited in the OBD meant their migrations.) e-, says Robert, signifies
tendency or passage toward, or reinforcement; psychological moving and
shaking baving laken over from physical, the question is what tends to produce
it.
The difficulty is that we can't always teil whether the moving and shaking
are things we do (or even are), or whether they are done 10 us, by otbers, by
circumstances. A message arrives; the paper flutters from the recipient's hand,
she sinks to the floor in a dead faint. Obviously the message had some causal
relation to the fainting-but did it make her faint, or did she make herself faint
as a way of refusing to accept it? In the Sketch Sartre opts for the seeond
account: emotions are intentional mechanisms that fix an unacceptable world for
us magically, rendering it totally unreal if necessary. But tbat isn't quite
Roquentin's situation-on the contrary, part of his problem seems to be that be
isn't emotional enough: tbe world isn't unaeeeptable, it'sjust a bit strange. This
reminds us of that other ease of wbat psychiatrists would call "tlat affeet, "
Meursault in Camus's The Stranger. Your average post-war French anti-bero
"isn't the emotional type.
Nor of course was Sartre. He has tbis in common with Roquentin, that
they are both weiters; their project of salvation, if they fmd one, will be through
words. Emotion can't be the end of anything, it will at most be a stage on the
way to something else, accompanied and in the end occluded by other existential
factors. At the end of the Sketch Sartre says that
the psyehologieal theory of the emotions assumes a prior description of afTeetivity,
to the extent that this constitutes the being of human reality, that ia 10 the extent that
it is constitutive of Dur human reality to be an affeetive human reality. In thil ease,
instead of beginning from a study of emotions or of inelinatioßl that would point to
a human reality as yet not elucidated al the ultimate goal of al1 research, an ideal goal
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moreover and probably out ofthe reaeh of anyone who begins from the empirieal, tile
deacriplion of affeet would be earried out on Ihe basis of the human reality desc:ibed
and fixed by an CI priorl intuition (ETE 66).
In other words there's really not much mileage in the emotions as such, so
Sartre mayasweIl go back to the a prior; intuitions about human reality that are
already bis stock in trade. That is the answer to my first question.
Among these intuitions one stands out in Sartre from beginning to end.
Not merely an intuition: it is a rooted conviction on bis part that human heings
are conscious and intentional beings once and for aU, and that the only thing that
can subvert a conscious intention is another conscious intention, albeit one that
O18y ~ dissembled, even to oneself (the act of dissembling, of course, requiring
yet anolher conscious intention, possibly dissembled in its tum-and so on). It
is characteristic of him, and of Roquentin as an element of bis autobiography,
that bis conscious intention sbould be reflexive. Roquentin thinks about tbe way
he feels, and writes obsessively about it, and as Sartre says somewhere else the
event, written down, is no longer the same. Yet tbe writing is part of bis human
reality, part of bis project.
"Noussommesprojet, c'est-a-diredepassement du subi, " says Sartre-"we
are project, that is to say transcendence 0/ the undergone. " This lapidary
formulation occurs in The Fanlily Idiot, weil into it, near the heginning of the
second volume in French, on page 1294 in fact. It provokes two reflections: first
that tbe late Sartre is still faithful to some at least of the categories of the early
one, and second-particularly in view of the emphasis in the passage, wbich is
reflected throughout the Idiot, subi heing allDOst invariably italicized-that the
issue of activity versus passivity, contingency versus choice, is still central to
his concems. Subir, "to undergo, " is a key verb for Sartre, and focuses what is
probably the most constant preoccupation of bis work. For everything in human
life looks as if it just happened to us, but it is essential that everything should
feel as if we were doing it.
This imperative of feeling is just what Sartre in the passage fromthe
Sketch cited above means by an apriori intuition, and it is what convinces hirn
that, in the end, emotions are chosen. Dut the nagging question remains, as it
probablyalways must (given that it embodies ODe of the fundamental antinomies
of reason), whether the feeling corresponds to any assertible reality. The early
Sartre was prepared unhesitatingly to claim complete intentional dominance of
the free subject over its project, but as time went on reality-in particular
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political reality-asserted i/self and compelled hirn to change his mind. The later
view is far more modest: freedom is reduced to "the small movement which
makes a totally conditioned social being someone who does not render back
completely what his conditioning has given hirn" (DEM 35).
This last formulation comes from an intelView, "The Itinerary of a
Thought," in which tbe intelViewer refers to Sartre's "forthcoming study of
Flaubert, " parts of wbicb bad been published in Les Temps Modernes, and says
of it that "one is struck by the sudden re-emergence of the characteristic idiom
of the early work-thetic consciousness, ego, nihilation, being, nothingness"
(BEM 33). It seems to me that not only the characteristic idiom is recaptured \>ut
also, in certain very important respec~, characteristic ~onvictions. In spite of
what Sartre leamed after the war, which by his own account changed
everything, he still cannot get away from a stubbom insistence that we make our
own lives, that we make them as significance, and that Flaubert made his in this
way. Given his conditioning, the Hotel-Dieu at Rouen, the July Monarchy and
the rest, still at some level Flaubert chose to be Flaubert, chose the passivity and
the hebetude and the gigantism and the laughter.
Chose, also, his emotions-that goes, in context, without saying. Out to
say that is not to say anything nearly as interesting or informative as the more
specific, and still very partial, characterization given at the end of the last
paragraph. Also the relations between those other traits and the emotions become
very complex. Passivity and hebetude look like ways of not having emotions (to
be immobile is precisely to resist motion of any kind). And if emotions are ways
of escaping an unacceptable reality, there can also be active ways of escaping
unacceptable emotions, for example role-playing, in which Flaubert indulged
from an early age, or writing, an intellectualizing defense he shares with Sartre.
We can get some idea of what has happened to the concept of emotion in Sartre
by looking to see where it surfaces in the work on Flaubert.
It would be hazardous for me to assert, OD this basis of a motivated but
hurried re-reading of those 2800 pages (like War a"d Peace, it's a world ODe
can get happily lost in again and again), that I've caught everything Sartre has
to say on the subject. Dut my impression-and it confirms the view stated above
as to the importance of the concept-is that it is very little. This is not because
Sartre rejects the emotions, it's just that they aren't of foeal theoretical interest
for hirn, he has other ways of dealing with what they represent. Once or twice
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there are direct allusions, once near the beginning of the work to a novel aspect
of the question:
. . . aclive emotions-Ibove In when il 'I I question of mlsculine chlrlcters-lre
IbundlntJy described in our literllure; hlrdly any room is made, on the other hand,
for grief, for plnic. for rage: they hippen neverlheless, cutting out our legs from
under UI, plralyzing our tongues. relaxing our sphincters; pushed to the extreme we
lose our sense, and r.n in • he.p at the feet of the sworn enemy we would have
wished to murder (IF 1:45).
This, as I have pointed out elsewhere (Sa 194), is a elear anticipation of the
Fall, the crisis at Pont-I'Eveque in 1844 during wbieb Flaubert collapsed while
driving bis brother Achille in a cabriolet from Deauville to Rouen. Sartre
devotes several hundred pages to a direct analysis of tbis event, and it recurs
repeatedly as a kind of obbligato accompaniment throughout the work.
ODe might expect, given the comment about the short shrift aecorded in
literature to the passive emotions, that Sartre would conduet mueh of the
analysis in their terms, but he does not. The language of emotion ereeps in
occasionally: Flaubert suffered from a "permanent hyperemotivity" (IF 11: 1792),
he is "consl;tuted by emotional discharges" (IF 11: 1814). But the attempt to
explain the Fall as provoked by thc emotional shock of a near-eollision with a
heavy wagon in the darkness, which immediately preceded Flaubert's collapse,
is rejected by Sartre as inadequate (IF 11: 1835). Emotion, it seems, is too vague
a category for such areal and really decisive event. The whole inquiry proceeds
on a more concrete level.
The problematic of the emotions as suffered or chosen is not lost, it is
subsumed under the larger project. There is a hint near the beginning of volume
11 of the Idiot of the relegation of emotions as sueh to an unreal domain when
Sartre quotes as signifieant Flaubert's early text Bibliomanie and the eharaeter
Giacomo who "reserved all his emotions for his books" (IF 11: 1147). Sartre's
project is to give an account of the reality of Flaubert's life, to write a true
novel about him. This drive to reality undereuts emotions, which have an
irrealizing, a magically unrealizing, effect, whereas Sartre says that he wanted
from the beginning to "provide a philosophical foundatioD for realism. . . . In
other words . . . to give man both his autonomy and his reality among real
objects, avoiding idealism without lapsing into mechanical materialism, " and still
believed this possible at the time of the publication of the Flaubert (BEM 36-37).
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The reality is Flaubert's own project, which is a totalization of bis own
experience under the form of arte The concept of totalization is of course
Sartre's, but he attributes it to the young Flaubert in the person of his creation
Djalioh, in the very early work Quidquid volueris. Djalioh is an ape-man who
is at one with nature; in hirn we find, says Sartre, reciprocity between
immaneoce and transceodence. The passage is worth quoting:
... one may say, depending on circumatancea, that he (Djaliohl dissolvea himself in
na1ure or that i1 wholly enters into him: althou,h it seems tha1 these involve oppoaite
behaviors, they are the same, difTerentJy accented; IOmetimeathe soul ia formed aa
an infinite lacuna and the world ia awallowed up there and somelimea it ia a finite
mode of aubstance; imprisoned in Ihe limila of ila detennination, il annihilaies itaelf
in order 10 flow beyond ita fronliera and realize ila belonging 10 the Whole withoul
parts in the very movement that dislOlves ill particularity. What counta i. that the
fundamental intention docs not change: what ia aimed for in both cases is 1otalization.
A reciprocal totalization of the miel'OCoam by the mael'OCOlm aOO of Ihe latter by the
former. Thil double and aimultaneou. belongin. of the sou1101he world, of the world
to the soul, Flaubelt eaUa, when it il the object of a eonerete aod lived experience,
simply Poetry. One migh1 equally weil give it, when il aelualizes itsel f in gathering
up the whole of being and the whole man in an intentional synthesis which operales
on the basis of a negation of every analytic detennination, the name melaphysical
allilude (IF 1:33).
We have here a characteristically Sartrian formulation of the paradox
adumbrated in the Sketch, along with an equally characteristic proposal for its
solution. It is a question of choosing, but of choosing one's owo
contingence-having emotions, to be sure, but of appropriating them as part of
one's own project. It is this impossible and yet oecessary self-ereation, the free
insisteoce on the inevitable (the echo of Hegel is certainly not accidental, given
the source of the early Sartrian categories eIJ-j·oi and pour-so;), that is the
trademark of Sartre's form of human being. He thinks that Flaubert sometiJnes
achieves it. Flaubert writes to Alfred Le Poittevin: "I certainly have deep
serenity though everything troubles me on the surface," "I am really very weil
since I've agreed always to be ill," and Sartre comments: "Gustave cannot write
these ambiguous lines without having known the strange states in which doing
land undergoing are indiscemible, in which ODe cannot decide where endurance
ends and complacency begins" (IF 11: 1794).
\ So we choose OUf Iives and their significance, and it follows from this, to
rvert to the subject of this diSCOU:~~ that we choose our e:otionso__or:_
emotions are what we choose. Or: what we do with our emotions: that 's what
choosing is. Or: choose your emotions-but choose the ones you have! To put
it differently. but in Sartre's own words-the vocabulary of the early Sartre.
utilized by the late Sartre and thus encapsulating the continuity of his work in
spite of all appearances to the contrary (but even the appearances, if one looks
closely enough, aren't to the contrary): "Take original contingency as the final
goal of constroctive rigor." Tbe passage from which this citation comes is worth
quoting in extenso and may serve as closure for this paper. Sartre is speaking,
early in the first volume of the Idiot, of the hazards ofbirth and upbringing, the
determination of the child by the mother and yet its need to make itself, and
shifts to the analogy of the work of art and a reference to Mallann6's nUn coup
de des":
Thus the work ia chance and conatnaction at the same time and ia the more fortuitoua
the more carefully built it is: Nicola. de Stael committed suicide, among other
reasons, because of having undentood thia inevitable curse of the artist, and that the
artist can neither refuse contingency nor accept it. A solution: take original
contingency as the final goal of constnactive rigor. Few creators bring themselves to
this resolve (lF 1:60).
And then a footnote: "Flaubert, as we shall see, is among their number; it
makes the grandeur of his work. "
For Sartre, as we know, the writer is the paradigm of what the human can
be. The work whose grandeur he commends in Flaubert is literary, to be sure,
but the passage follows a discussion of what any mother might do to any child,
what any ontogeny might 00. The work might 00 a life, might be our life. We
can choose whether or not to live it, how to live it, with what "metaphysical
attitude" to live it, indeed we can't help doing this (though whether we
understand how we choose is another story). Our emotions are part of the
package, whether leading or following we can also choose. But we don't have
to choose them as a primary vehicle for our reflection, and Sartre, as far as I
can see, did not do so.
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